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ABSTRACT  
This chapter examines the political economy of Sino-African land acquisition with emphasis on land use 
for agriculture. Set within an institutions framework, it articulated a discourse on the motivation of 
Chinese cooperation with Africa. On China’s role in Africa, the chapter identifies pessimistic views that 
focus on the potential imperialist character of China in African development as well as optimistic views 
which posit that African states have a crucial role to play in being architects of their own development, by 
setting institutions in place to maximize gains from Chinese development cooperation. From an historical 
perspective, large-scale land acquisition involves dispossession of land capital, legal aspects of property 
rights - which have gendered perspectives - and information asymmetry, all of which are recognized 
challenges to foreign investment in Africa. The chapter amplifies the silent reality that other emerging 
economies such as India and Brazil can influence agrarian transformation of Africa. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The African population, 60 to 70 per cent of which reside in rural areas, is largely dependent on low-
productivity traditional agriculture as a means of livelihood. Consequently, in the growing discourse on 
Africa’s structural transformation, agriculture has been identified as a crucial driver of economic 
transformation, with potential to increase food supply, rural incomes, exports as well as inputs for 
industry. Agriculture also has a huge potential to distribute labour to the industrial and adjoining service 
sectors. In this way agricultural productivity has financed most industrialization experiences in Africa 
(African Center for Economic Transformation, ACET, 2014). Land holdings for agricultural use thus 
contribute to economic development. Empirical evidence is replete on the channels through which 
agricultural productivity reduces poverty, increases income, employment, as well as its rural non-farm 
multiplier and food prices effects. Nonetheless, levels of technology adoption, initial asset endowment 
and the extent of market access places a limit on the capability of the poor to contribute to the gains that 
accrue from growth in agricultural productivity (Schneider & Gugerty, 2011). Thereby, limited access to 
land can reduce the contribution of smallholder-driven agricultural development to poverty reduction 
(Cervantes-Godoy & Dewbre, 2010; Schneider & Gugerty, 2011). 
 
On the whole, about 2.5 billion people in developing countries secure their livelihoods by engaging in 
agriculture; also far reaching is how the agricultural sector links to other sectors of economy (DFID, 
2005). Not only is agriculture a source of input for other industries, it generates foreign exchange, value 
added and has multiplier effects across the economy (Mucavele, 2010). There are examples across Africa 
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of how agriculture contributes to employment, growth and poverty reduction. In Malawi, agriculture 
accounts for 39 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 85 per cent of labour force and 83 per cent of 
foreign exchange earnings and by 2010 it contributed 33.6 per cent to the Malawian economic growth. 
Also, in Mozambique agriculture is the main stay of the economy, employing 90 per cent of rural 
households (80 per cent of total population). 97.4 per cent of rural households in Zambia are engaged in 
agriculture (amounting to 45 per cent of the population), with most of the farming households being 
smallholder, subsistence farmers (Mucavele, 2010). Thus, wherever agricultural production is prime, such 
as in Africa, land is capital.  
 
The strategic nature of land capital dates back to the 18th Century, during which period Physiocrats 
posited that land was the ultimate source of value, thereby investing heavily to secure it. In the 19th and 
20th centuries respectively, labour and capital were perceived to be more important factors of production. 
Notably, the turn of events in the 21st century has resulted in the renewed pursuit of land as a strategic 
asset (Adusei, 2010). Land is a vital part of social, economic and political life in most parts of Africa. It is 
also of historical and ancestral significance to the African people, thus making the management of land 
rights a central concern of African governments and cooperation agencies (Quan, Tan & Toulmin, 2004). 
Moreover, the rapid growth of population and expanded markets puts increasing pressure on land 
resources which before seemed inexhaustible. The limited coverage of formal land institutions and 
weakened nature of customary land management, results in insecurity of property rights for the grassroots 
in Africa, a major factor relegating Africa’s development (Quan, Tan & Toulmin, 2004). Hence, a 
scramble for foreign investment in land (especially for agriculture) is with the hope that investment in 
land would facilitate the diffusion of modern agricultural technology, enhance domestic capacity and 
skills, invigorate low productive agro-sectors and lead to sustained increases in agricultural output 
(Adusei, 2010). 
 
Even though there has been a decline in FDI to Africa since 2009, Chinese FDI in Africa has increased 
from US$1.44 billion in 2009 to US$2.52 billion in 2012 with an annual growth rate of 20.5 per cent 
(China-Africa Economic and Trade Cooperation, CAETC 2013). With over 2000 Chinese enterprises 
engaging and growing in several parts of Africa, the share of sector distribution ranges from 1.1 and 2.5 
per cent for real estate and agriculture investments respectively, to 20.6 and 15.3 percent respectively for 
mining and manufacturing interests (CAETC, 2013). While most of the growth in Africa is accounted for 
by the energy resource boom and gains from extractive activities as well as improvements in services, 
there is a growing need to direct investment to agriculture, which accounts for 70 to 80 percent of 
employment on the continent (Africa Progress Panel, 2013). Specific to FDI in African agriculture, 
Chinese engagements increased by 175 per cent, from US$30 million in 2009 to US$82.47 million in 
2012. These engagements include agricultural investments in the use of improved seed varieties, 
cultivation of grain and cash crops as well as processing of agricultural products (Africa Progress Panel, 
2013). The concern for the sustainability of Chinese FDI efforts in Africa is most pertinent to this chapter. 
In light of the intense debate on Sino-African relations, this chapter questions the growing relationship 
between China and Africa with special focus on FDI in land. It highlights determinants, challenges and 
prospects of Chinese FDI in African agriculture, drawing on the pattern and motivation of Sino-African 
investment flows. In addition, set within an institutions framework, this chapter charts a course for win-
win relationships that will prevent manifestations of a form of neo-colonialism by China as some Western 
experts speculate.  
 
In what follows, a brief historical perspective on the Sino-African relationship and a discussion of various 
associated empirical issues drawn from existing research is presented. Also, there are highlights of the 
challenges posed by Sino-African land investments and prospects for the future. Most pungent is the land 
rush, which is simply an accumulation of land capital taking place on the continent, problems associated 
with land titling, leases and accessing industrial land for investment purposes. The chapter concludes by 
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highlighting notes for further research in the effort towards making Chinese FDI work for the goal of 
sustainable agricultural development in Africa.  
 
BACKGROUND 
Political Economy of the Sino-African Relationship 
The convocation of Chinese and African bureaucrats in year 2000 evolved the adoption of two documents 
– the Beijing Declaration and a Programme for the China-Africa Cooperation in Economic and Social 
Development – which earmarked an era of improved Sino-African relationship. Following this, there has 
been a record of increased Chinese investment in Africa. Chinese development cooperation with Africa 
employs a diversified strategy with investments led by private-owned as well as state-owned enterprises. 
The Chinese government provides commercial lending support and priority to foreign investment projects 
in sectors of particular interest. By and large, China combines its investment pursuits with trade and 
development assistance on the continent, an approach which has received criticisms from experts that say 
the Chinese approach to business (that is, a trade/investment-for-aid approach) is not in conformity with 
the set OECD benchmark rules for international engagement. However, the tie between China and Africa 
has continued to deepen within the framework of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (CAETC 
2013). This chapter shares the optimism of Shelton (2001) that given their shared histories, Africa may be 
a likely and winning partner to China for a desirable economic renaissance in the 21st century. 
 
The political economy underpinnings of the China-Africa relationship receive a great deal of attention in 
the literature, with most wide criticisms a result of purported threats to Western interests on the continent. 
As it continues to blend aid with trade and investment, China is buying its way into securing investment 
deals for its private firms (African Progress Panel, 2013). Nevertheless, it is apparent from the evolution 
of the Sino-African relationship that the interaction is not new; given the crucial role shared historical 
burdens (of imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism) and identity played in the construction of 
China’s Africa policy.i In essence, China invariably understands Africa’s psyche and current struggles for 
sustained economic growth, social stability and peaceful coexistence. However, there is a dire need for 
Africa to recognize that the days of the Non-Aligned Movement that united Africa and China (in the spirit 
of Afro-Asian solidarity and a shared history of anti-imperialist struggle) after colonialism are long gone, 
raising the imperative to stand up against any whiff of colonialism which the relationship may portend 
(Sanusi, 2013). From an historical perspective of Chinese engagement in Africa, China’s policies in rural 
Africa has moved from ‘fraternal socialism to amicable capitalism’ in the 1960s, to increased emphasis on 
mutually beneficial development aid in the 1980s, to the installation in recent years of agro-technical 
demonstration centres with its public-private model that can guarantee the sustainability of its investments 
(Brautigam & Tang, 2009). 
 
China’s move into Africa can be founded on four major considerations. Firstly, the relationship thrives on 
the importance of Africa’s resource potential to the Chinese economy. Secondly, Africa’s growing 
population is a pointed and potential market for China’s consumer products.ii Thirdly, the leverage that 
Africa’s openness to cooperation in the areas of minerals prospecting, labour contracting and 
infrastructure development projects provides. China’s projected and changing consumption patterns has 
laid the imperative for sources of natural resources required for its sustainable growth and 
industrialization. A fourth consideration is the Chinese recognition of African countries that are veritable 
targets for profitable long-term investments. Also, given its strong penchant for the promotion of peaceful 
international relations, guided by its principles of non-interference with internal affairs, as well as support 
of the African struggle for national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, China has 
endeared itself to the heart of many African governments. China’s force remains undeterred by 
ideological constraints, and it focuses on common trade and investment interests, unlike its Western 
counterparts (Shelton, 2001). 
 
4 
 
The Chinese government does not necessarily prioritize desirables with respect to inter-governmental 
support for democratic reforms and human rights in its commercial cooperation with Africa.iii Thus, the 
challenge in the examination of the China-Africa relationship is the question of: Is Africa moving from 
the imperialist domination in the past by the West to a more subtle exploitative relationship with China? 
To this end, greater need will arise for more credible evidence-based studies with distinct methodological 
severity in order to ascertain the truism about dispossession and exploitation associated with large-scale 
land acquisitions in recent times (Omondi Odhiambo, 2008; Oya, 2013). 
 
Dimensions of China’s Direct Investment in Africa 
Over the period 1979-2000, Chinese investment in Africa was highest in the manufacturing industry, 
accounting for over 46 per cent of the investment on the continent, followed closely by investments to the 
services sectors (about 40 per cent of all investments to the continent). FDI inflows to the agricultural 
sector in Africa only accounted for about 4 per cent of all Chinese FDI projects on the continent. Data on 
China’s outward FDI to top host countries and territories by 2005 (in UNCTAD, 2007) buttresses the fact 
that Africa is merely a fraction of Chinese investment priority. Only three countries, Sudan, Algeria and 
Zambia were on the list of top 20 host countries for Chinese FDI by investment value. It is clear from 
Table 1 below that Chinese priorities have been in manufacturing, resource extraction, construction and 
other services.   
 
Table 1:  Sectoral distribution of China’s FDI inflows to Africa, 1979-2000 
Sector/industry No. of projects Investment value 
(Million US$) 
% of projects 
Agriculture 22 48 4.4 
Resource extraction 44 188 8.8 
Manufacturing  230 315 46.1 
  Machinery 20 16   4.0 
  Home appliances 36 25   7.2 
  Light industry 82 87   16.4 
  Textiles 58 102   11.6 
Other  34 86   6.8 
Services 200 125 40.1 
Others 3 6 0.6 
Total 499 681 100 
Source: UNCTAD (2007) Asian Foreign Direct Investment in Africa 
 
Between 2003 and 2008, China’s outward FDI to Africa had grown exponentially from US$74.8 million 
to about US$5.49 billion, with investments in about 85 per cent of the 53 African countries, giving 
credence to its open door policy. With respect to regional concentration, Southern Africa received the 
most proportion of the Chinese investments, followed far behind by West Africa and North Africa, while 
Central Africa attracted the least investment over the period (Claassen, Loots, & Bezuidenhout, 2011). 
Medium growth economies as a group received the highest average Chinese investments, followed by the 
high growth economies, lastly the low growth economies. Given the diversified nature of Chinese 
investment, diversified African economies accounted for over 64 per cent of overall Chinese FDI to the 
continent over the period 2003 through 2008. South Africa, Nigeria, Zambia, Algeria and Sudan were the 
top five destinations for Chinese FDI, while Niger, Democratic Republic of Congo, Madagascar, 
Mauritius and Egypt had the sixth through tenth positions respectively (Claassen et al., 2011). By the end 
of 2011, the agricultural sector only accounted for about 2.5 per cent of China’s direct investment in 
Africa, while the extractive industry accounted for over 30 per cent of Chinese direct investment in Africa 
(Han, 2013). 
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Noting the sectoral distribution of FDI in Africa, mining, oil and infrastructure are vital determinants of 
Chinese FDI to Africa. Limited empirical evidence point to the pursuit of agricultural land as a 
determinant of Chinese FDI. Even though in smaller proportions, there is evidence of Chinese investment 
in African agriculture, motivated by the rising trend for increased food crop production driven by the 
recent global food security crisis and a concomitant increase in global food prices (Hallam, 2009). 
However, the volume of land acquisition for the purpose of agricultural use has not been backed by valid 
evidence on the ground even though media reports propagate the growing magnitude of such large land 
deals (Brautigam & Zhang, 2013). In Africa, the main recipients of Chinese agriculture FDI are Sudan, 
Tanzania and Ethiopia. The main driver of land acquisition based on the Land matrix database, is 
agricultural production involving the cultivation of food crops, followed closely by biofuels (Landmatrix, 
2014). 
 
Based on data from Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), Brautigam & Zhang (2009) compared 
the myths propagated by media reports and unfounded opinion articles of China’s involvement in 
agriculture for the purpose of food security with empirical realities. The data, as shown in Table 2, 
includes the total number of Chinese firms across various sectors in all African countries, out of which 
firms involved in grain or cash crop production as well as animal husbandry, were highlighted. The 
distribution of Chinese firms in the farming sector for the production of grains, livestock and cash crops 
show the low level of involvement in agriculture compared to investment presence in other sectors of 
African countries.  
 
Table 2: MOFCOM-approved Chinese farming investment proposals, Africa 
Country No. of Chinese 
companies 
Total 
No. of Chinese 
companies 
Farming sector 
Grain crop (corn, 
rice, cassava etc 
Cash crop 
(sisal, sugar, 
rubber, etc) 
Livestock 
(chickens, 
eggs, etc) 
Angola 102 2 2 1 1 
Benin 26 1 .. 1 .. 
Cameroon 36 3 2 .. 3 
CAR* 7 1 1 1 .. 
Congo, DR 89 3 3 3 .. 
Egypt 109 1 .. .. 1 
Eq Guinea 20 1 1 1 .. 
Ethiopia 130 2 1 2 1 
Gabon 26 2 2 2 2 
Ghana 115 2 1 2 .. 
Kenya 91 3 2 3 1 
Liberia 24 2 2 2 2 
Madagascar 26 2 1 1 .. 
Malawi 6 1 .. 1 .. 
Mali 37 4 1 4 .. 
Mauritius 45 1 .. 1 .. 
Mozambique 58 6 3 4 1 
Nigeria 270 6 4 4 4 
Rep Congo 36 2 2 2 2 
Sierra Leone 29 1 .. 1 .. 
South Africa 175 4 2 3 3 
Sudan 83 6 4 6 2 
Tanzania 112 5 1 5 1 
Togo 30 1 .. 1 .. 
Uganda 57 1 1 1 1 
Zambia 158 16 16 10 16 
Zimbabwe 81 7 4 7 3 
Totals 2372 86 56 69 44 
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* Central African Republic 
Source: Brautigam & Zhang (2013) based on data from Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), People’s Republic of 
China, Beijing, 2013 
 
Thus, Chinese FDI in Africa’s agricultural sector are insignificant when compared to investments in other 
sectors -mining, manufacturing, communications and trade (Amanor, 2014). Most Chinese FDI in Africa 
has been in form of equity joint ventures (UNCTAD & UNDP, 2007). One study shows how Chinese 
firms engage in joint ventures in the fish industries of Mozambique, Namibia and Gabon and how they 
hire farmland in Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe (see Claassen et al., 2011). Moreover, Chinese FDI in 
agriculture does not play a significant role in all African economies. Scoping studies carried out by 
Kapilinsky & Morris (2009) on the significance of Chinese FDI in sectors of twenty sub-Saharan African 
highlight the: significance of Chinese investment in the economies of Ghana, Madagascar and Zambia; 
moderate significance in Kenya, Mali and Uganda; and relative insignificance in Cameroon and Tanzania. 
This is indicative that, even though Chinese involvement is principal in Africa’s cotton production sector, 
only in Zambia does it play an important role in the sector. 
 
DETERMINANTS OF AFRICAN LAND RUSH 
In the immediate post-independence periods for most African and Latin American countries, governments 
permitted the appropriation of land to multinational corporations for the production of cash crops and 
food crops without setting up due regulatory mechanisms. The absence of such regulatory frameworks iv 
resulted in a lot of adverse conditions for local small-holder farm communities who previously engaged 
the use of such land (Chaponniere, Gabas & Qi, 2010). Nevertheless, land acquisitions since the turn of 
the century have been purportedly motivated by objectives of food security and scale economies. Foreign 
investment in farmland in developing countries, at different stages - initiation, ongoing and concluded, 
was about 15 million and 20 million ha of farm land (Chaponniere et al., 2010). With the spate of land 
deals in African countries such as Madagascar, Ghana, Ethiopia, Mali and South Sudan, acquisitions in 
Africa is expected to be on the rise with additional consideration for water resources as a crucial focus of 
investments (Cotula, Vermeulen, Leonard & Keeley, 2009; Chaponniere et al., 2010; Woodhouse, 2012). 
 
Increased FDI in land is driven by myriad of factors including the 2007/2008 food crisis, leading to 
emerging studies on the subject of large-scale land acquisitions. FDI in land refers to a lasting investment 
interest by a foreign entityv in the acquisition of land use rights and/or land ownership. The investment 
interest acquired in land use rights covers a definite time period which may be extended depending on 
investor interest and land availability after the lease period (Gӧrgen et al., 2009). Even though, FDI in 
land is mostly driven by private individuals from rich countries with little arable land and water resources, 
investors from industrialized and emerging countries with large populations and rapid economic growth, 
like China and India (Gӧrgen et al., 2009) also purportedly have massive interests. Specifically, China, 
backed by her policy of ‘going global’, has continued her quest for world resources, stepped up efforts to 
acquire foreign companies, grown in geopolitical and financial clout, and continues to send shock waves 
throughout the global business world as its manufacturing sector and knowledge economy booms 
(Fishman, 2006). This is not without recourse to other transnational corporations expanding their 
contribution to global value chains by seeking major investments in cross-border land acquisitions. Thus, 
global land rush describes the quickening since 2008 in transfer of land from use in smallholder and 
pastoral sectors to large-scale agricultural land cultivators and/or speculators (Alden Wily, 2012). 
 
The acquisition of land is definitely not a new phenomenon, however the form and motivation for large-
scale land acquisition has been evolving. Since the turn at the food crisis in 2007/2008, the International 
Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), 
United Nations mandated Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and International Fund for 
Agricultural Development (IFAD), International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) have made 
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attempts at gathering data and instituting database of global land acquisition deals, and determining for 
what purposes such land acquisitions are engaged (Cotula et al., 2009; Chaponniere et al., 2010). Given 
the relatively nascent nature of studies on the land grabbing and mostly unreliable data sources on land 
deals, more important are on-the-ground country case studies to provide direction on the true state of 
foreign investment in African land (Brautigam & Tang, 2009). 
 
The quantum leaps in large-scale land acquisition as available data indicates, caused a steer in the United 
Nations on the concern for a new form of colonialism, turning over communal land to massive 
commercial use (Vidal, 2009). The commercial pressure on land and new global dash for land are the 
increasing demand for fuels, fibre, animal feed and food. There are speculations on agricultural land as a 
result; for instance, the rise in European demand for biofuels to mitigate climate change and 
environmental concerns from the use of fossil fuels is also a deciding factor (Anseeuw, 2013). Empirical 
studies examine the determinants of China’s move into Africa. Biggeri & Sanfilippo (2009) empirically 
analysed the determinants of Sino-African relationship, using a panel data set for 43 African countries. 
The findings of the study indicate that the increased Chinese move into Africa is driven by the strategic 
interaction among outward foreign direct investment, trade and aid. The pull factors, contributing to this 
relationship are the recipient countries’ endowment of natural resources and market potential. Sauer and 
Leite (2012) also carried out a study on agrarian structure, foreign direct investment in land and the 
consequences on land prices in an emerging country context. 
 
However, the importance of database, tools and study techniques in evidence-based research reports are 
crucial to policy implementation on land issues. Oya (2013) is one of such studies that have examined the 
methodological issues related to the land grab literature as well as databases in recent times. It emphasizes 
a methodological approach to the large-scale land acquisition deals with respect to the use and reliability 
of data sources, given the unreliability of some reported data (See also White, Borras, Hall, Scoones, & 
Wolford, 2012). Major methodological gaps can be identified with respect to the accuracy and reliability 
of data on large-scale land deals and the vastly untested assumptions that underlay most of the studies in 
the rapid-growing field research on land grabs (Oya, 2013). While some authors posit that Chinese large-
scale investment in agriculture, is mostly with the purpose to export back to their country (Olsson, 2012). 
Other country based cases of Chinese engagement indicate that most agricultural ventures primarily serve 
the local market (See Cotula et al., 2009; Chatelard, 2014; inter alia). Thus, indicating the need for 
methodological straits in studies of Chinese FDI in land. 
 
Several studies investigate determinants of FDI in Africa, most of which find all or some of market size, 
past level of FDI, corruption, domestic credit, oil share in exports, domestic investment, religious tension, 
and risk as significant (See Asiedu, 2002; Claassen, 2011; Ibrahim, Elhiraika, Hamdok & Kedir, 2011). 
While some firms seek natural resources (including agricultural land and minerals) and cost-cutting 
resources, others seek strategic assets (such as technology and skills) necessary for enhanced productivity 
(Gelb, 2010). For instance, Chinese FDI in Ghana is mostly market seeking, targeting the Ghanaian 
domestic market and West Africa. Over the years, Ghana has been an attractive location given its relative 
political stability, level of infrastructure development and relatively lower custom duties and clearing 
taxes. A fraction of Chinese FDI in Ghana is resource seeking in the agricultural sector. According to 
Tsikata, Fenny, & Aryeetey (2010), eight Chinese companies were established in the Ghanaian 
agricultural sector (poultry, fishing, fish and vegetable farming) over the period 1994-2007, worth about 
US$5 million. The recent discovery of oil in Ghana and some other African countries is expected to 
increase Chinese oil prospecting moves on the continent. With most of Chinese FDI in Ghana being 
greenfield investment (with the majority being wholly foreign-owned), foreign investment presence 
promotes the creation of new and augmented production capacity in the country (Tsikata, Fenny & 
Aryeetey, 2010). 
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Other triggers of increased foreign investment in agricultural land acquisition in Sub-Saharan Africa 
include: the volatility in the financial capital markets; insecurities of energy supplies and factors that 
account for global environmental governance (Woodhouse, 2012). A well deserved focus on the supply 
side of land deals takes into consideration the risks and potentials of such deals; all of which can be set 
from an historical perspective to understand the political economy dynamics of natural resource control in 
recipient countries and the challenges for investment in African agriculture. Thus, the reality of the land 
rush is eminent in the potential detrimental effects to poor land-dependent households and their land use 
property rights as well as the future it portends for conflict and class transformation (Alden Wily, 2012). 
 
Chinese agricultural expansion can be attributed to their commitment to increasing commercial leverage, 
improving political relations and stabilizing local food and energy supplies in the face of changing 
consumption patterns (Buckley, 2013 as cited in Rosengren, 2014). As such, many studies on China-
Africa cooperation focus on the dominant sectors with relative neglect of the contributive aspects of 
agriculture, which is a main employment stay on the continent. Other emerging studies are optimistic that 
the second wave of Chinese investments in Africa will be in agriculture and services sector. However, in 
addressing the future of agrarian investments in Africa, investment constraints such as high risks, low 
infrastructural development, structural uncertainties, problems in land market and ambiguities in property 
laws will need to be addressed (Sun, 2011; Asanzi, 2012). 
 
Against conventional wisdom, there is no evidence that private firms depend on imported labour from 
China. Contrariwise, rising costs of production in China is influencing the choice of Chinese outward FDI 
to Africa. Moreover, since Africa’s young population are faced with limited economic opportunities, 
Africa has become a toast to Chinese firms seeking relatively cheap labour, access to low-cost land and 
cheap raw materials. The example of a textile weaving factory with operations in Ethiopia with prior yarn 
import-dependence on China presents a succinct case of the role cost plays in the land rush (see Shen, 
2013). As reported in Shen (2013: 24), after over 6 years of operation in Ethiopia, a textile factory owner 
encouraged his Chinese supplier to co-locate in Ethiopia, where high quality and low price cotton could 
be grown. The decision of the Chinese supplier to co-locate with his customer created a win-win scenario 
for both investors, which involved a large-scale land acquisition (such that “...the buyer and supplier 
jointly purchased a parcel of industrial land big enough to build new factories for both weaving and 
spinning”).  
 
In an empirical study on Nigeria, Osabuohien (2014) found that characteristics of target communitiesvi 
play a key role in determining large-scale agricultural land acquisitions. Specifically, size of the 
community (area), its population and population density, volume of rainfall and the educational level of 
community leaders were found significant in determining the variations in large-scale agricultural land 
acquisition across rural communities in Nigeria. However, the local institutions in the communities do not 
have a significant influence on the possibility of large-scale land acquisitions, since the State is 
empowered by the Nigerian Land Use Act as a custodian of large-scale land allocation rights. This is 
contrary to the Ghanaian case, where local chiefs and social institutions play a vital role in the process of 
large-scale land acquisitions. Boamah (2014) highlights the role of customary tenure regimes whose 
allocations are controlled by Ghanaian chiefs, trustees of land for community members, as empowered by 
the Ghanaian constitution. The role of local social institutions and political actions in land deals is evident 
in Boamah’s case studies of large-scale land allocations for two biofuel investment projects in Ghana, 
with attendant implications for access to land by indigenes and migrants in the project areas.  
 
Moreover, for different countries, the question of who owns the land is very important is determining the 
relationship with private investors, domestic or foreign. In Ethiopia, the land is owned by the government 
and the people, rather than private individuals or organizations. This makes land allocation easy and with 
investment conditions that are favourable to the development of agriculture in Ethiopia as well as 
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beneficial to the investors. Since the land is constitutionally owned by the Ethiopian government and the 
people, federal and regional governments play a crucial role in managing land investment processes in 
Ethiopia. Although Ethiopia has a very favourable climate and government regulations for agricultural 
investment, it has not attracted many high quality foreign agricultural investments. The high costs and 
difficulty in developing land in Ethiopia, owing to the poor state of infrastructure,vii security issues, 
exploitation of investment licenses amongst other things, discourages quality agricultural investments 
(FAO, 2012). 
 
Furthermore, in an empirical investigation of the determinants of Chinese FDI in Africa, Claassen (2011) 
found that China invests less in countries which are close to fully utilizing their agricultural potential. 
Chinese firms choose to invest in countries with underutilized agricultural land, which create ample 
opportunities for agricultural expansion. The study further indicates that food and energy security are 
significant determinants for Chinese investment in Africa. Nevertheless, the possession of arable land is 
not enough to attract Chinese investment in land for agriculture use. For example, even though Guinea 
boasts of over 6 million hectares of arable land and a favourable climate for agriculture, there are several 
factors that limit Chinese FDI flow to the country. Kokouma & Xu (2013) found factors such as 
landlockedness, weak governance structure, official corruption, lack of policy transparency, weak 
infrastructure as well as the high cost of doing business owing to landlockedness to be responsible for 
minimal attraction of Chinese FDI. Also, Senegal’s performance in FDI, compared to other sub-Saharan 
African countries, is poor owing to structural bottlenecks which affect its competitiveness. Senegal’s 
vulnerabilities include: its high illiteracy rates, poor basic infrastructure, unreliable power supply, 
unfriendly tax system, land insecurity, inflexible labour code, high level corruption and ambiguous 
competition policies amongst other things (FAO, 2012). 
 
It is thus pertinent to note that Chinese investment in agricultural land does not lace every country of 
Africa contrary to what media reports portray. The significant interests of other emerging economies as 
well as considerable domestic private interests in large-scale land acquisitions have not received 
concomitant media attention. In Ethiopia, for instance, although investments by Indian firms account for a 
number of land acquisitions, most land acquisitions are by domestic investors and the Ethiopian State for 
the cultivation of industrial crops (Keeley, Seide, Eid, & Kidewa, 2014). Albeit agriculture is the 
mainstay of the Ethiopian economy, contributing half of the GDP, and over three quarter of both 
employment and exports, thus the government places large-scale land investment for plantation 
agriculture as a vital factor in its development strategy.  
 
Chinese presence in the North African countries of Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia is most 
pronounced in energy, infrastructure, development and retail trade. It is however pertinent to note that 
North African countries, especially Egypt, in welcoming Chinese partnerships push more for investments 
with potential for technology transfer. To this end, China in addition to direct investment in land for 
agriculture use, among other things, has provided technological assistance and support to Egyptian 
agriculture for decades (Alden & Aggad-Clerx, 2012). This encourages the inflow of technology-based 
investments into other sectors of the economy including efforts to improve energy security in the country.  
 
CHALLENGES OF SINO-AFRICAN LAND ACQUISITIONS 
Accumulation of Dispossession 
There are myriad views of China’s investments in Africa, all of which can be grouped into two. First is 
the category of the pessimistic views shared by analysts that examine the role of China as a neo-
colonialist concerned with resource scrambling and securing the structure of its economy against the 
economy of developing Africa (Chen, 2013). This stance alludes to the large-scale acquisition of land and 
oil deals on the continent and the underlying influence they wield. Further, research that hold these view 
criticize China for its approach of combining aid with trade, using diplomatic tools to gain access to the 
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continent. Indeed, China, rides on the weak institutions in individual countries, for the exercise of 
exploitative tendencies. Holders of these view are mostly scholars most of Western orientation laden with 
Sino-phobic tendencies.  
 
However, to take this pessimistic approach in emphasizing the imperialistic tendencies posed by foreign 
direct investment in Africa is to ignore the role and actions of the African states and their governing 
authorities in facilitating such large-scale land acquisitions without given concession to the social security 
of the local land owners and poor farmers. Concomitant to this, it is inaccurate to speak of the effects of 
large-scale land acquisitions as illegal ‘land grabs’ or a precursor of neo-colonialist tendencies (Cheru & 
Mordi, 2013). This is because country governments, and in some cases local social institutions 
(Schoneveld, German & Nutakor, 2010; Boamah, 2014), play an active role in facilitating those long term 
large-scale land leases towards domestic investment promotion. 
 
Thus, there are social, environmental and governance aspects of FDI in agribusiness, which trigger 
questions in the specific areas of land use and of land rights (Newton, 2012). Moreover, in contemporary 
debates on land in Africa, the issue surrounds dispossession in relation to large-scale land acquisition 
deals. As such there are issues in land acquisition from disputative land deals to un-contentious ones. The 
contentious nature of most large-scale acquisition is termed the international land capital ‘accumulation of 
dispossession’ for the purpose of investment in agricultural production of high-value luxury goods for 
exports, alternatively biofuels amidst the global energy price uncertainties (Bush, Bujra & Littlejohn, 
2011). What about land and food sovereignty? Even though the large-scale enclosure of land, 
dispossession and limited access to land may raise business productivity and increase revenue to the 
government to finance development, there are wider implications for social welfare of displaced 
smallholders (Bush et al., 2011). The state will be doing a great disservice to its citizens, creating class 
conflicts when social protection mechanisms are not in place to shield locales from investor 
expropriations.  
 
In the light of the above, the World Bank stance that commodification of land in Africa is to allow the 
market self-regulate efficiently may not be beneficial. Experience in developing country contexts 
indicates that the market does not have all the answers; this makes the role of the state essential with 
respect to FDI in land. Thus, the role of the state as a facilitator of dispossession must be adequately 
recognized and amplified. This perspective brings to fore the social dimensions to the ‘production and 
reproduction in land use’ as well as the ‘gender and class dynamics’ which result from the dispossessions 
(Bush et al., 2011). As in the Mozambican sugar industry case by Burr, Mondlane & Baloi (2007), land 
deals ‘prefaced by colonial dispossession and reaffirmed as the post-colonial nationalization of land’ can 
result in the ‘consolidation of many productive economic sectors’ (Bush et al., 2011). 
 
On the other hand is the set of overly optimistic views of the role of China in Africa, led amongst others 
by the writings of Deborah Brautigam,viii which analyses the potential of China’s involvement in 
promoting increased economic activities and reducing the incidence of poverty on the African continent 
(Brautigam, 2009). Emphasizing the Chinese policy of non-interference, driven by its notion of ‘going 
global’ as a matter of deliberate policy; this view dwells more on the institutional frameworks that need to 
be set in motion for FDI in land for agricultural use to deliver on its promises. Given the drive of foreign 
land acquisition such as agricultural production for increased food supply and the scramble for African 
metal, mineral and marine resources, Borras, Fig, & Suárez (2011) noted that this scramble for the 
continent’s resources has increased the optimism about how Africa will exploit this development capital 
to accelerate its growth and development (Polack, Cotula, Blackmore, & Guttal, 2013). Thus, land deals 
need not lead to the deterrent of the African economy from maximizing their development experience.  
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In the line of providing direction on institutions, the World Bank has developed a code of conduct to 
guide land deals to ensure they conform to tenets of equity and sustainability, rule of law without harms 
to food security. Nevertheless, the existence of such international code of conduct does not preclude 
developing countries and SSA countries in particular, from setting country-specific conditionalities based 
on their specific national development priorities and interests. World Bank principles of responsible 
agriculture investments can serve to curb corruption in land deals, as well as disruption, displacement and 
dispossession among poor community lands holders (Borras et al., 2011; De Shutter, 2011; White et al., 
2012). The prevalence of settler colonialism in southern Africa, characterised by the “large-scale 
dispossession, the confinement of the indigenous rural population to densely-settled ‘native reserves’, 
massive state support for the development of a white settler farming class and discrimination against 
small-scale black farmers in the reserves” is instructive (Cousins & Scoones, 2010: 32). It resulted in a 
highly dualistic farming sector in Southern Africa with a large-scale capitalist segment, characteristic 
dominance of production for both domestic and international markets, coexisting with a largely peasant 
agrarian sector laden with meagre infrastructure and deprived access to markets.  
 
The Problem of Who Owns the Land 
Another problem facing Chinese agriculture investments in Africa is property rights. Within a legal 
framework, there are issues surrounding land thefts and global large-scale land acquisitions – violation of 
people’s rights and property rights resulting in class conflicts as well as ‘class-creating social 
transformation’ (Alden Wily, 2012; Tyler & Dixie, 2013). Sub-Saharan Africa’s historical terrain (fuelled 
by weak links created by its colonial heritage) and contemporary times make it most susceptible to large-
scale involuntary land loss. In addition to the weak links, legal manipulations of the domestic property 
laws facilitate supply during land rushes, against the notion that indigenous/customary tenures confer 
property rights. In the broad narrative, the surrender of land by local land-dependent households are 
involuntary or in the alternate case, misinformed. Having laid claim to the property right to land, 
governments reserve the right to lease land; in which case, the investors are basically accumulating what 
some other people have been dispossessed of. In most cases, African governments are noted as the 
principal drivers in large-scale land transfers. (Alden Wily, 2012; Asanzi, 2012) 
 
Given that several land acquisition deals are still at their speculative stages whereby, it becomes difficult 
to envisage the long term impacts of these deals on local populations and structure of agricultural sector 
(White et al., 2012). Noting that for some investors, land acquisition is not an end in itself. The end will 
be determined by the purpose for the investment and this could vary the magnitude and impact. Apart 
from the possibility of agricultural investments, large-scale acquisition could be a form of speculative 
investment where investors hope to get returns by betting on rising land prices (White et al., 2012). 
However, there are other adjoining questions that arise from large-scale foreign land acquisitions: What 
influence are the large-scale land acquisition deals having on the agrarian structures in developing Africa? 
What are the adjoining issues of inclusion and exclusion that surround land deals - the class and gender 
aspects to land use and property relations?  
 
Some studies have examined gendered perspectives to the ownership of land rights in Africa (inter alia 
Whitehead & Tsikata, 2003; Mohan & Power, 2008; Doss, Meinzen-Dick, & Bomuhangi, 2013). In a 
study on rural Uganda, Doss et al. (2013) analyse gender issues related to the ownership of land in order 
to draw implications for large-scale land acquisitions. The study draws a lot on how the rush for 
agricultural land is impinging on issues bordering on property rights, customary tenure systems and 
access to land tenures.ix Furthermore, in a discourse on the gendered perspective on the contemporary 
issues around land tenure in Africa, Whitehead & Tsikata (2003) reiterated that recognition of the 
exercise of gender justice with recourse to land issues can evoke important changes in political and legal 
practices and cultures. This will entail redistributive land reformsx away from regressive land reforms in 
which case the government grabs land from the poor and give its use to the rich (White et al., 2012).  
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Access to agricultural land-related information for the purpose of foreign land acquisitions is a challenge 
to investment in sub-Saharan Africa, where most foreign investor companies lease land from the state. As 
reported by the 2010 Investing Across Borders report, close to 50 percent of African countries surveyed 
do not permit private ownership of land. Moreover, the time required to lease land from the state varies 
from 2 months in Mali to 10 months in South Africa. Performance also vary with respect to the 
availability of land information; it is easier to access land information in countries which have land 
registries such as Mauritius and Nigeria, and difficult where such public registries do not exist as in 
Madagascar and Ethiopia. Across SSA the strength of the long term lease rights also varies (World Bank, 
2010). On the whole, the challenge to African countries inundated with poor land information systems, 
regulatory framework and poorly-defined property rights is to ascertain the volume and type of 
agricultural investments to be considered. Also up for consideration is the effect such investments will 
have on public goods delivery as well as on the rights and livelihoods of local communities. Given 
allegations of non-transparency in Chinese-Africa deals, institutions that improve the transparency and 
accountability of the investors-target government negotiation processes are necessary. This would ensure 
negative impacts of land investments on local communities are minimized (De Schutter, 2011; Tyler & 
Dixie, 2013; Dixie, 2014). 
 
CREATING PROSPECTS FOR A WIN-WIN RELATIONSHIP 
Given the concerns about the new trends in China’s presence in Africa, research analysis must continually 
propose functional models. Notably, even though China poses to be a partner in development, Africa 
needs continuous appraisals of the relationship to minimize potential threats to the future of its economy. 
African countries therefore need to understand the choices for development that China-in-Africa poses, 
not just within economic frameworks but also within socio-political and global politics. It is the 
framework of operations that Africa puts in motion that will determine whether China manifests as: an 
agent of neo-colonialism or as a partner in fostering a desirable economic renaissance of the 21st Century; 
a contributor to internal conflicts or a propeller of economic growth and development; a pursuer of 
distorted individual relationships with countries or; a promoter of unified interactive developments with 
regional cooperation bodies for a unified framework for interaction (Dadzie, 2012; Sanusi, 2013) 
 
Other pertinent issues surround the role of regional cooperation stakeholder institutions, such as the 
African Union (AU), in the present and future of Chinese engagement on the continent: What are the 
prospects, for securing a market for goods and services or a longer- term cooperation as partner in the 
development of Africa? How is the Sino-African linkage promoting the future of African 
entrepreneurship? In consideration of the Sino-African relationship, it is possible that China will not be 
wilfully disposed to engaging with Africa on the whole through linkages forged with the AU and civil 
society organizations (Dadzie, 2012). However, within the AU framework, it is desirable that Africa 
speaks with one voice with respect to her dealings with China; this should help give the continent some 
leverage with regard to trade negotiations and investment criteria. If Africa starts to speak in unison on 
matters of policy relevance in dealings with China, China may lose the leverage it currently exercises 
given the divergent strengths of institutions in SSA countries. 
 
Another concern should be what the effect of China’s rise in Africa on the industrialization drive on the 
continent? While Africa relies much on manufactured exports from China, the agricultural commodities 
which are imported from Africa are low value added goods feeding Chinese industries, a form of the basic 
colonialist structure (Olsson, 2012). Thus, the clamour for structural transformation of the African 
economy cannot be overemphasized; this will ensure efficiency and that African agricultural commodities 
can feed its industries leading to the production of manufacturing exports that are competitive in national 
markets, regional markets, and in perspective, global markets.xi Furthermore, the impact of China’s 
agricultural investment on the technological capacity of traditional agriculture is to be emphasized; this 
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would help to improve the contribution of agriculture to the gross domestic output. This is a vital point to 
note because, in as much as Chinese FDI in Africa is sought after, studies show that little technology 
transfer is associated with the large-scale and capital intensive investments of China in Zambian 
industries, for instance. Since technology spill-overs from FDI are not automatic, formal linkage 
programs can be established between local farm holders and proximate foreign investor firms involved in 
large-scale agriculture to encourage technology spill-overs. A viable lesson can be drawn from the case of 
the Mozambican sugar industry in which rehabilitation, through targeted FDI, revived the local industry 
(Burr et al., 2007). The Mozambican industry case indicates that even though international financial 
institutions and international capital have some influence on economic and industrial policy, the 
government can be an active player in generating development success stories. This reiterates that African 
governments must be principal architects of the continent’s future.  
 
The role of government in providing safety nets and social protection is essential if FDI in land would 
deliver on its promise. Evidently, the opening up, for instance, of special economic zones (SEZs) in 
Africa entails large-scale land acquisitions. Political commitment is imperative to address the ills 
associated with the opening of SEZs in Africa. Providing compensation and benefits to the adjoining 
populations could be in form of the adoption of win-win models for all parties – beneficiary investors, 
citizenry with the national development framework. This is essential as security issues can be posed by 
displaced holders of small properties, creating an unfavourable investment environment (Gill & Reilly, 
2007). African countries can get better investment bargains with guidance from the voluntary guidelines 
on the responsible governance of tenure of land, fisheries and forestries in the context of national food 
security (as adopted in May 2012 by the committee on World food security). This also calls for the 
strengthening of the land tenure security, as investors target countries with weak land tenure security and 
strong investor protection (De Schutter, 2011; SIANI, 2012). The result of enhanced tenure security will 
be the creation of mutually beneficial business models that would put the interests of all stakeholders, 
government, foreign investors, small holder farmers and the public into consideration. Examples of such 
models involve contract farming, joint venture between foreign investors and farmer cooperatives which 
also promotes learning by interaction.  
 
Land acquisitions can be used as a tool to promote rural development, improve livelihoods and create 
employment. Infrastructure development spinoffs such as is characteristic of Chinese investment could be 
set off in rural areas when land made available for investment is close to rural settings. The reality that 
most of current agricultural land deals are close to cities may not augur well for the infrastructure 
development needs of rural areas (SIANI, 2012). Incentives should be created for Chinese investors in 
order to enhance the possibility of attracting rural development infrastructure projects. FDI in land can 
also help improve diversification of crops in the domestic economy. The production of high quality fresh 
fruits from foreign investor farms in Senegal served to expand the consumer choices in the local markets 
(SIANI, 2012). So as to sustain livelihoods of Africa’s young population in FDI projects, production 
systems that are favourable to the creation of job opportunities should be encouraged. When foreign 
investment in agriculture employs a good production mix of capital and labour, it creates opportunities for 
increased crop production and transfer of skills to the local population.xii  
 
As an alternative to land acquisitions, agricultural investment and collaborative business models can be 
adopted. Lessons can be drawn from other emerging economies and developed countries to foster 
agricultural investment which have ample development opportunity for the local economies of Africa. 
Such collaborative business models can be formulated within the context of the main forms of Chinese 
FDI in Africa, equity joint ventures. (UNCTAD & UNDP, 2007; Cotula & Leonard, 2010). An example 
is the outsourcing business model employed in the China-Africa cotton development initiative (Asanzi, 
2012). Africa can also encourage the family farming models along side agribusiness development models 
to ensure adequate social protection. Evaluation of business models for improved returns to smallholder 
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farmers would be good to check the negative effects and facilitate positive spin-offs from FDI in land in 
the domestic economy. 
 
In addition to encouraging the proliferation of business models that involve foreign-local partnerships, 
investment criteria should place emphasis on technical assistance and technology transfer, for example the 
creation of demonstration centres. This practice can be seen in the Chinese cooperation with Central 
Africa, where the implementation of agricultural demonstration centres is enhancing the productivity of 
local smallholders and leading to product and process innovations (Dzaka-Kikouta, Kern, & Gonella, 
2013). In the light of this, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in collaboration with the United 
Nations Food and Agricultural Organization can continue to evolve creative approaches to improve 
domestic capacity (Polack, Cotula, Blackmore, & Guttal, 2013). Noting that agricultural transformation is 
crucial to the structural transformation of the African economy (Africa Progress Panel, 2014), large-scale 
international investments can only be contributory if, through the workings of domestic institutions, they 
engender technology transfer, expanded market access, employment creation, improved food productivity 
as well as upstream and downstream linkages within the domestic economy. Otherwise, the outcome of 
foreign land acquisitions will portend a neo-colonialist drive rather than a win-win situation (FAO, 2012). 
  
There is need for integrated data across countries useful for studying trends in FDI related to the 
acquisition of land for agriculture in Africa. African countries can develop land information systems 
made accessible, with the use of information communication technologies across the globe. Also, the 
availability of state-by-state land registries within countries will help increase access and availability of 
land information to potential inventors. More important is the integration of such information on land 
across all government departments in order to make information on land easily accessible without the 
necessity of investors’ physical presence in a prospective country. Towards establishing commitment to 
best practices, Chinese investors as individuals and groups can take a deliberate stance on non-
involvement with controversial large-scale land acquisitions which have resettlement imperatives. The 
Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC) has over the years practiced this land acquisition 
motive, only procuring the use of existing moribund estates, privately-owned underutilized land or land 
that are largely unsettled (Tyler & Dixie, 2013).  
 
Against the background of the above prescriptions, with strengthened regulatory capacity of national, 
local and social institutions and properly defined property rights, Africa can leverage the boom of FDI in 
agricultural land for increased productivity and structural transformation.  
 
FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
Contrary to widespread views, China is not the major land grabber in Africa and its companies are not 
mostly producing for export to the Chinese market (Chatelard, 2014). Most of the Chinese agricultural 
investments in Africa serve the local market and neighbouring countries, basically due to the nature of 
staple food crops produced. Agricultural exports to China from Africa are cash crops and other 
commercial crops for industrial processing. While media interest is intense on the Sino-African 
relationship there are silent realities of other emerging economies and their potential relationship with 
Africa, especially India. Based on data from the Land Matrix database, the Indian government is the 
leading single foreign investor in African land. As opposed to the state-led Chinese initiatives, Indian 
investments are largely private sector led. Thus, further studies will need to focus more attention on other 
emerging economies and their presence in Africa as well at the implications for regional cooperation and 
development. 
 
A crucial question to ask is, given Africa’s sustained growth in other sectors apart from agriculture, what 
is the future of agricultural transformation for Africa? Having noted that China is only one of the least 
players in the African agrarian cooperation with respect to investments, there is the need to evaluate the 
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political economy of other ‘land grabbers’ in their relations with Africa. By their sheer economic strength 
among countries in the global south, emerging countries’ influence on the African continent will 
definitely be on the rise. For instance, a recent study by Alemu (2014) examined how Brazil and China 
are cooperating to help Ethiopia achieve its development ambitions. Furthermore, given Brazil’s 
biotechnological breakthroughs in agriculture as well as its functional agricultural business models that 
take cognisance of technology learning, social inclusion and eradication of poverty, it is a development 
model Africa must study. Examples of development cooperation across the African continent involving 
Brazil are studies to watch out for, in order to glean insights that can sharpen the African agrarian 
landscape. Given the rise of South-South cooperation initiatives toward Africa, other imperative research 
questions are: How does the BRICS development cooperation model excel the traditional western 
stereotypes Africa is familiar with? ; What is the role of absorptive capacity in technology spill-overs 
from agricultural investment in Africa? ; To what extent can Africa’s agrarian transformation contribute 
to pro-poor development and poverty alleviation? ; What are the frameworks for ensuring technology 
spill-overs from FDI in agriculture in Africa? Going forward, giving the prominence of Indian 
investments in African land as indicated by the Land Matrix, a study on the problems and prospects of 
Indo-African FDI in land will be insightful.  
 
Furthermore, current literature emphasises the prevalence of joint venture forms of Chinese investment in 
African agriculture. Nonetheless, as Chinese consumption patterns raises the prospects for a wave of 
mergers and acquisition activities with major players which may lead to emerging investments in “grains 
and oilseeds, farm inputs, animal protein and food processing”, the socio-economic implications and 
impact evaluation of such business activities are essential (Valoral Advisors, 2013: 6). The contrasting 
impact of mergers and acquisitions against greenfield investments in African agriculture can also be 
examined.  
 
Finally, based on an overview of literature, much of the studies on land acquisitions only examine the role 
of foreign investment in recent land acquisitions. However, the impact of large-scale land acquisition by 
domestic investors and the Diasporas has received far less attention. With respect to Diasporas’ 
investment, a hypothesis on the effect of remittances on investments in land may require empirical 
testing. Moreover, a study on the political economy of private domestic as well as intra-African large-
scale land acquisitions will greatly enrich the literature. With respect to the scope of studies, discussion 
around Africa has been for the most part around land resources, yet there are more accents to be ascribed 
in empirical literature on possible expropriation and exploitation of Africa’s water resources. In light of 
this, the Africa Progress Panel report (2014) espouses the essence of harnessing Africa’s agriculture, 
forestry and water resources for Africa’s development. It is desirable that more studies emerge on the 
problems and prospects of foreign investment in Africa’s water resources.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has examined the political economy of the Sino-African FDI in land acquisition with 
emphasis on land use for agriculture. Set within an institutions framework, it articulated a discourse on 
the motivation of Chinese cooperation with Africa. On China’s role in Africa, the chapter identifies the 
pessimistic views that focus on the potential imperialist character of China in African development and 
the optimistic views that recognise that African states have a crucial role to play in being architects of 
their own development by setting institutions in place to maximize gains from Chinese development 
cooperation. The motivation for Chinese cooperation with Africa centres on Africa’s resource potential, 
its sheer numbers for Chinese manufactured exports, potential for maximum investment yields and 
openness to partnerships for resource exploitation amongst other things. The chapter recognized from an 
historical perspective that large-scale land acquisition involves dispossession of land capital, legal aspects 
of property rights which have gendered perspectives and information asymmetry as challenges to foreign 
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investment in Africa. On negotiation rounds with Chinese investors and state, speaking with one voice on 
the regional economic cooperation platform, which the AU provides, can sweep away the excessive 
leverage China currently wields – based on the varying strength of institutions in African countries where 
it has vested interests. 
 
Giving the nascent nature of studies on recent land grabs, we conclude that country case studies and 
records of foreign land acquisitions and investments are more reliable than media reports on the volume 
of land acquired for investment or speculative purposes. Also, since most land acquisition deals are at 
different stages of development, it may not be feasible to totally envisage the effect of the proposed 
acquisitions on targeted sector outcomes. The state is recognized as a crucial player in dispossessions 
involved in large-scale land acquisitions. Thus, emphasis in reporting should not just be placed on the 
demand side (investor) but much more on the supply side (which in most cases in Africa is the country 
governments). Otherwise stated, if there are rising insecurities of investments in Africa (an aftermath of 
displacements and dispossession) as a result of foreign land acquisition, governments are to be held 
accountable, not the investors. We identify that actions by governments towards industrial development 
and enhanced export performance, such as the creation of special economic zones, also have implications 
for adjoining farm-dependent communities. More attention need to be paid to the provision of social 
protection and safety nets for families displaced as a result of large-scale land transfers. More desirable is 
the adoption of business models that ensure a win-win situation for all stakeholders involved and affected 
by land acquisitions. 
 
Even though China in Africa poses as a partner in development it is more of a competitor, as its activities 
may undermine the industrial development of Africa. However, with greater focus on regionalization of 
interaction with China, Africa can have a better deal with respect to development outcomes and the 
strengthening of institutions. Furthermore, given the Chinese model of combining trade and investment 
with aid in cooperation, African countries can leverage this to negotiate rural infrastructural development 
spinoffs in regions where land use rights are to be acquired. 
 
Going by the Chinese share of investment in African agriculture, China is not a major grabber of land for 
agricultural land use after all. This chapter recognises the silent reality that other emerging economies 
such as India and Brazil can impact on the agrarian transformation of Africa. It points to further study 
potentials on the pattern, motivation and political economy of other emerging economies’ investments in 
Africa’s land as well as water resources. It proposes a stance in line with the 2014 Africa Progress Panel 
report, that avoiding land grab may be a way to make agricultural policy inclusive and successful in the 
African region. However, much more realistic is to ensure mechanisms exist that protect local rights, local 
interests, livelihoods and welfare. 
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KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 
Accumulation of Dispossession: accumulation of reserves of marginalized and under-used agricultural 
land. 
 
FDI in Land: Foreign direct investment in land for agriculture use. 
 
Global Land Rush: Quickening since 2008 in transfer of land from use in smallholder and pastoral 
sectors to large-scale agricultural land cultivators and/or speculators. 
 
Institutions: A framework that depicts guidelines and rules through which socio-economic relationship 
among individuals and economic agents in a particular country is regulated. 
 
Neo-colonialism: Subtle use of economic, political pressures to control resources and influence other 
countries. 
 
Political economy: Consideration of interrelationships between political and economic influences on an 
observed relationship. 
 
Property rights: Clearly defined terms on how resources are owned and used. 
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Sino-Africa: Of Chinese relationship with Africa. 
 
Win-win: Creating a situation where each party involved benefits in some way. 
 
 
 
 
ENDNOTES 
                                                          
i For detailed historical overview on the Sino-African relationship, see Alden and Alves, 2008; Mohan and Power, 
2008; Woodhouse, 2012) 
ii This has implication for the deindustrialization of Africa as Colonial Europe did (Rodney, 1972) 
iii See Omondi Odiambo, 2008 for more on Chinese indifference to the vast war crimes and human rights abuses in 
Darfur and Sudan 
iv Such as those for social protection smoothing 
v Private or public 
vi with respect to availability of land, current land use patterns and population densities inter alia 
vii Such as roads, power, telecommunications 
viii See http://www.chinaafricarealstory.com/p/my-published-research.html; 
http://deborahbrautigam.com/research/journal-articles-book-chapters/ http://deborahbrautigam.com/blog/ 
http://deborahbrautigam.com/2014/03/30/chinese-overseas-land-investments-how-active/ 
ix See the evolutionary theory of land rights/ property rights in Doss, Meinzen-Dick and Bomuhangi (2013) 
x See Cousins and Scoones (2010) for neoclassical economics, new institutional economics, livelihoods, radical 
political economy and Marxist variants to the subject of the viability of redistributive land reforms 
xi The rise of China and what it spells for industrialization in SSA (see notes from Kapilinsky, 2008) 
xii This may have indirect effects on African entrepreneurship development). 
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